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The Danish Armed Forces face the functional imperative of becoming a smaller, 
professional expeditionary force and the societal imperative of including women and 
ethnic minorities. It currently lags behind its NATO partners in gender and ethnic 
diversity. Lessons to be learned from NATO members with more diverse militaries, such 
as the United States, Great Britain, and Canada, include recognition of diversity as a 
societal imperative to sustain the legitimacy of the armed forces, the necessity of 
systematically collecting and reporting personnel data to guide policy, the necessity of 
patience and realistic goals, systematically developing recruitment, development, and 
retention policies, and the superiority of an all-volunteer force over conscription in 










In April 2011, the Danish Ministry of Defence (MoD) issued a policy on diversity for its 
27,500 employees, 61 percent of whom are members of the Danish Armed Forces 
(DAF). The policy is the latest in a series that began in 1962 when women were allowed 
to join the armed forces. It was issued to encompass the many initiatives underway and 
to guide future efforts. One of those efforts is this report, which has been commissioned 
by the MoD from the University of Copenhagen as a part of the contract between the 
Centre for Military Studies and the MoD. 
 
Diversity encompasses many dimensions of the people who constitute society. The 
MoD, however, limits its diversity concerns to women and ethnic minorities: “at the 
heart of the problem is the low number of women in uniformed positions and the 
number of ethnic minorities in both civilian and military posts.”2 Therefore, gender and 
ethnicity are the focus of this analysis. 
 
The armed forces are the institution that utilizes organized violence to achieve the 
objectives of the state. To do so legitimately, this functional imperative is tempered by a 
societal imperative to reflect the values of society. Changes in the international situation 
and technology have encouraged NATO members to construct smaller, professional 
expeditionary armed forces, while changes in the social ethos of gender relations and 
immigration have broadened the population expected to be included to legitimize the 
military as an institution of a democratic state. Denmark has been affected by these 
trends. 
 
The DAF normally compare their policies with those of other Nordic countries. In this 
case, there are few lessons to be learned from such comparisons. The Nordic countries 
have faced the same functional and societal imperatives, followed the same policies, and 
had similar degrees of success. Despite societal norms of gender equality and 
proportionately small populations of ethnic minorities, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden 
have made limited gains in terms of increasing the percentage of these groups in their 
armed forces. In 2000, Denmark ranked 11th among NATO countries in the percentage 
of its force that were women – behind countries such as France, Belgium, Hungary, 
Portugal, and Spain.3 Norway ranked 14th. Valuable lessons can be learned, however, 
from the experience of the United States, Canada, and Great Britain, which ranked 1st, 
2nd, and 4th, respectively, among NATO countries with regard to the percentage of 
women in their military.4 The armed forces of these Allies have had longer to adapt to 
the functional and societal imperatives now challenging Denmark – and therefore have 
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more to offer, as the Defence Command has recognized with regard to expeditionary 
operations.5  
 
We therefore synthesize the lessons of these “diversity leaders” into five that are 
relevant for Denmark. First, increasing the diversity of the armed forces is a necessary 
policy for NATO countries. Second, the systematic collection and reporting of relevant 
personnel data is necessary for the successful implementation of a diversity policy. 
Third, setting realistic goals for increasing the representation of members of designated 
groups contributes to success. Fourth, policies that develop a large pool of potential 
recruits among designated minority populations, target them specifically for 
recruitment, and develop their human capital so as to increase their performance and 
likelihood of promotion and retention are the bases for success. Finally, countries that 
procure personnel for their armed forces through an entirely voluntary system have 
more diverse forces than countries utilizing some form of conscription. These lessons 
provide a broad basis for progress as the MoD and DAF attempt to balance the societal 
imperative of reflecting the values of society with the functional imperative of 
maintaining an effective armed force. 
 
Manning the Force: Functional and Societal Imperatives 
The purpose of military manpower policies is to staff the armed forces with an adequate 
number of persons possessing appropriate levels of capability and skill to perform the 
functions required by the political authorities.6 This functional imperative is 
complemented by – and at times in tension with – a societal imperative to reflect the 
values of society. From the time of the French Revolution until recently, these 
imperatives were complimentary for Western states. Mass armies conscripted from the 
populace provided an effective means of static territorial defense and an opportunity to 
indoctrinate the people in the civic culture of the nation.  
 
Recent changes in the international environment and increases in technology have 
reduced the utility of such military force structures relative to smaller, better-trained 
expeditionary forces. Concomitant changes in societal values and demographics – 
gender equality, greater participation of women in the workforce, immigration, and 
ideas regarding the representation and inclusion of members of these groups in all 
aspects of civic life – have increased the number of persons considered eligible for 
military service. This increase in supply and decrease in demand has created tension 
between the functional and societal imperatives of manning the armed forces. 
 
Denmark has been adapting to these functional and societal imperatives. In the 1980s, 
the DAF shaped itself into a smaller, more professional force, better capable of 
deploying for contingency operations abroad.7 Danish policy with regard to distributing 
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the remaining burden of service in the armed forces fairly across the population has 
focused primarily on women and ethnic minorities, the latter being defined as 
“immigrants and descendants from non-Western countries.”8 Danish diversity policy 
has followed a general trajectory of increasing equal opportunities to serve in the armed 
forces by removing barriers to participation, mitigating factors that reduce retention, 
increasing recruitment outreach, and, most recently, increasing the prospects for 
promotion and career success. These policies originally focused on gender but have 
been extended and adapted to deal with ethnic minorities. 
 
Prior to 1962, women were barred from military service and relegated to a separate 
auxiliary corps. Despite the lack of a legal barrier, few, if any, women served in the 
ranks. In 1972, the DAF began hiring women on contract to serve as noncommissioned 
officers and officer trainees. Women were admitted to military academies in 1974. 
These changes gradually increased the positions available to women, except those 
where there was a risk of combat. After a decade of study, women were permitted to fill 
combat positions in 1988, except piloting fighter aircraft, although this restriction was 
lifted in 1992. Since then, there have been no formal barriers to the inclusion of women 
in the DAF. 
 
Removing these barriers to participation opened up a second wave of policy initiatives, 
including an action plan for diversity issued in 1993. Efforts to increase female 
retention included regulations against sexual harassment, determining which women 
were motivated to be further developed professionally, and the reasons why some 
chose to separate. An office to assist the victims of sexual harassment was established in 
2005.  
 
The 2004 Defence Agreement established “Armed Forces Day” to systematically inform, 
assess, and induct young Danes into the armed forces. Young females were invited into 
the recruitment process and special materials were prepared to facilitate this. In 2006, 
955 women participated and in 2010 the number grew to 1537 – of which 567 enlisted.9 
Ten percent of the recruits reporting for the four months of basic training in 2011 were 
women, a figure which is expected to rise to 20–25 percent in 2012.10  
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These efforts dovetailed with policies designed to enhance the career prospects of 
women in the armed forces. Danish desires to implement United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 1325 provided an opportunity to address gender diversity within 
the armed forces and make changes important for female career advancement – even 
though the resolution is focused on gender issues amongst populations suffering from 
armed conflict.11 To assist the careers of women in uniform, the MoD pledged to 
increase their numbers in Danish peacekeeping contingents. Furthermore, the Defence 
Command adopted a charter in 2009 to promote the advancement of women within the 
ranks to management positions and leadership roles. The 2010 Defence Agreement 
directed the MoD to develop further initiatives “to ensure a higher percentage of female 
employees.”12 The result has been that the percentage of women in the regular armed 
forces increased from 5 percent in 2007 to 6.4 percent in 2011.13 Moreover, nearly 7 
percent of Danish troops deployed in expeditionary operations in 2010 were women.14 
 
Ethnicity and other characteristics15 entered into the policy discourse in 1998, grafted 
onto the equal opportunity framework devised to promote gender diversity. A 
subcommittee on the equal treatment of personnel in Defence jobs (ULIB) was 
established in 1998. In 2001, a policy putting “qualified women and ethnic minorities” 
in visible positions was enunciated and followed up with a booklet entitled Diversity in 
the Recruitment Process.16 In 2003, guidance to accommodate ethnic minority members 
with regard to holidays, diet, prayer, death, and burial was published. In 2004, the 
armed forces admissions exam was scrutinized for bias against minority candidates and 
found to be fair. In 2007, the MoD began the FOCUS program to develop and foster 
competence in all employees, including those in uniform, regardless of gender, ethnicity, 
age, and sexual orientation. Outreach to municipalities intended to better understand 
their minority communities (“MIX”) was undertaken in 2007–2008, and a program to 
foster citizenship and role models in Denmark (“Taking the Lead”) was implemented in 
the period 2009–2011.  
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Finally, in 2011, the MoD developed a Defence Action Plan for Equality containing 14 
measures to enhance equality for women and ethnic minorities in a systematic and 
comprehensive manner.17 These incorporate earlier and ongoing efforts at outreach, 
retention, and public affairs. These efforts resulted in the MoD winning the “Diversity in 
the Workplace” (MIA) Award in 2011.18 
 
A new factor to consider is that the MoD can no longer pursue its diversity agenda 
autonomously. It is obligated to embed its effort in that of the government, which set a 
target of 4 percent of the employees in the public sector being ethnic minorities from 
non-Western countries.19 Furthermore, the Act on Equality between Women and Men of 
2007 requires ministries to prepare a report on their policies and progress with regard 
to gender equality.20 
 
These policies have had an effect on the composition of the DAF. Figure 1 shows that the 
percentage of women has increased across the ranks since 2007.21 The one percent 
increase in females across all ranks corresponds with the implementation of increased 
efforts to recruit women during Armed Forces Day as well as the implementation of 
policies associated with UNSCR 1325.  
 
Figure 1: Percentage of Women in the Danish Armed Forces 
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Notwithstanding this success, the DAF has few high-ranking female officers. As of March 
2011, none of the 38 generals or admirals were female,22 3.1 percent of the colonels and 
navy captains were women, as were 0.7 percent of the lieutenant colonels and navy 
commanders.23 As the MoD’s diversity policy states:  
 
Despite the positive developments with more women serving in the 
uniformed organizations under the Ministry of Defence, the numbers 
show that significant challenges in recruiting, retention and the ability 
to make a career remain. This requires focus and action.24 
 
Significant challenges also remain with respect to ethnic minorities. Overall, their share 
of the Danish population has increased from about 3 percent in 1990 to a little over 12 
percent in 2010 – as shown in Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2: Percentage of Persons of Danish Origin and Immigrants and 
Descendants of Non-Danish Origin, 1990–201025 
 
 
The MoD reports that in 2010, only 1.1 percent of their employees, civilian and military, 
(“Forsvarsministeriet”) had an ethnic minority background, as compared to 7.2 percent 
of the Danish civilian workforce (“Arbejdsstyrken”). This is shown in Figure 3.26 Data for 
ethnic minorities in the DAF were not available. This possibly indicates that ethnic 
diversity is not a priority for the DAF or that ethnicity is so sensitive as to be taboo. 
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Given the available figures, it seems as though an effective framework for increasing the 
number of non-Western ethnic minorities in the DAF has yet to be developed. 
 
Figure 3: Percentage of Ethnic Minorities in the MoD and Workforce in 201027 
 
 
As this review of Danish efforts aimed at promoting diversity since 1962 makes clear, 
the focus has been on gender rather than ethnicity. All formal barriers to including 
women in the DAF have been eliminated. Policies enhancing the capacity of the DAF to 
retain women have been implemented. Efforts to recruit and retain more women across 
all ranks have been undertaken. In contrast, efforts to increase ethnic diversity have 
been limited. Although there are no formal barriers to recruitment – indeed, Danish 
citizenship is not a requirement for enlisting28 – attempts to reach out and reduce the 
impediments to retention have not received equal attention. The MoD has not reported 
the percentage of ethnic minorities in the DAF. Whatever the reason, greater efforts 
should be undertaken if increasing ethnic representation in the DAF is regarded as a 
societal imperative. Overall, the emphasis on equal opportunity for women and ethnic 
minorities has produced limited results. 
 
 
The Scandinavian Model 
Danish policy makers are comfortable comparing their initiatives to those of other 
Scandinavian countries. Norway and Sweden, in particular, are quite similar in terms of 
size, position in the international system, defense spending, economic development, and 
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cultural homogeneity.29 It is hardly surprising that they have faced similar functional 
and societal imperatives. Indeed, Denmark and Norway have retained conscription 
(Sweden began the transition to an all-volunteer force in 2010) and allow women to 
volunteer for military service.30 They have also adopted diversity policies similar to 
those of Denmark, leading some to refer to a “Scandinavian Model.”31  
 
Norway and Sweden have focused on gender integration through policies of equal 
opportunity and their policies have been moderately successful. Women were given the 
opportunity to serve in the Norwegian armed forces in 1977, but only in non-combat 
functions.32 This was changed in 1985. Although the Norwegians set an ambitious goal 
to have 15 percent of the armed forces be women by 2005, it has stabilized at 7–8 
percent.33 Sweden’s policy trajectory has been similar. It allowed women to serve in the 
armed forces in 1980 and they were allowed in combat functions in 1994.34 Since then, 
few women have volunteered and Sweden has repeatedly considered conscripting 
women so as to increase their numbers.35 It has not adopted such measures – indeed, it 
is transitioning to an all-volunteer system, which has had a positive effect on female 
enlistment.36 In 2008 and 2011, 4.9 percent of the Swedish officers were women, 9.2 
percent of enlisted personnel, and 2.1 percent of reserve officers.37  
 
Ethnicity has presented a greater challenge. The percentage of foreign-born Swedes has 
increased from about 4.5 percent in 1960 to 8.5 percent in 2011.38 Sweden has not 
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adopted a systematic policy for increasing ethnic minorities in their armed forces.39 At 
best, they have articulated a broad nondiscrimination policy.40 Likewise, immigrants 
and their descendants now constitute 13.1 percent of Norway’s population.41 In the 
1990s, Norway adopted the declared ambition for 4 percent of the national Defense 
Forces to be staffed by ethnic minorities by 2001; this goal had not been reached as of 
2010.42  
 
Overall, the Scandinavian Model might promote gender equality but has not succeeded 
in facilitating female military participation. Among NATO members, Denmark and 
Norway ranked 11th and 14th, respectively, in the percentage of their active duty 
military that is female.43 The ethnic and cultural homogeneity upon which the model is 
based has hindered the promotion of ethnic diversity. The percentage of ethnic 
minorities in the armed forces of these Scandinavian countries has failed to keep pace 
with the immigration into their societies and the rate of expansion of their descendants. 
This suggests that experiences from the world outside of Scandinavia might have 
something to offer. In the next sections, we examine some of these experiences. 
 
 
A-B-C—Easy as 1-2-3? 
Some Western states have faced the functional imperative of developing expeditionary 
forces and the societal imperative of integrating women and minorities longer and more 
fully than Denmark. The governments of the United States, Canada, and the United 
Kingdom have long used the military as a homogenizing force for their heterogeneous 
societies, composed of citizens of different linguistic, racial, ethnic, and religious 
backgrounds.44 Their strategic orientation toward expeditionary operations encouraged 
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smaller, more technologically advanced forces.45 The victory of classical liberal 
conceptions of citizen obligations over those of civic republicanism in the years after the 
Second World War reduced societal obligations toward compulsory military service.46 
This, in turn, reduced their ability to apply conscription uniformly across their 
populations and encouraged them to man their forces entirely with volunteers. Such 
forces could be better trained, equipped, and utilized in expeditionary operations with 
fewer political costs.47  
 
Surprisingly, volunteer forces have better integrated women and other minorities than 
conscript forces. How could this be? Members of disadvantaged groups see the military 
as an opportunity to improve their economic and social status. Volunteer-based policies 
entice different rates of enlistment among the subpopulations of these countries.48 
Generally, it was presumed that members of disadvantaged populations would enlist in 
the lower ranks at higher rates than members of advantaged populations and that the 
opposite would be true for the officer corps.49 This has proven true and yet has greatly 
improved minority inclusion. To correct the stratification of a volunteer manning policy, 
the United States, Great Britain, and Canada undertook efforts to increase recruitment 
amongst disadvantaged populations, increase their rate of retention, and subsequently 
their inclusion across all aspects of the force—by rank and by occupational specialty. 
The results have been positive: as of 2000, the United States, Canada, and the United 
Kingdom ranked 1st, 2nd, and 4th, respectively, among NATO countries with regard to the 
percentage of women in their forces50 and boast more minorities than any other. 
 
Even more interesting, gender has not had pride of place as in the “Scandinavian 
Model.” In the United States, a system designed to integrate Blacks has been extended to 
women and Hispanics. In Great Britain, a system designed to utilize colonial forces has 
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been adapted to integrate women and racial minorities. In Canada, a system designed to 
integrate Francophones has been extended to include women, indigenous people, and 
“visible minorities.” In each case, the challenges have proven extensive and the means 
used to overcome them have demonstrated meaningful patterns. These patterns 
highlight paths to success and their associated costs. 
 
 
The United States 
The United States has faced profoundly different challenges integrating Blacks, 
Hispanics, and women into its armed forces. These derive from the different historical 
contexts of these three groups and their respective positions in American society. 
Parallel efforts to integrate Blacks and women were developed in the 1970s and 
expanded to include Hispanics in the 1990s. 
 
Until the Second World War, the United States maintained a small military 
establishment in peacetime and filled out its ranks via conscription in times of war. 
Blacks and women were either excluded from military service or, with few exceptions 
during times of war, segregated into separate corps. The decision to man a large 
standing military in 1947 rendered the utilization of all available persons a functional 
imperative.51 The military was formally integrated in 1948, although implementation 
lagged until after the Korean War.52 Women were also permitted to serve in uniform in 
1948 but were limited to 2 percent of enlisted personnel, 10 percent of officers, and 
could reach no higher rank than colonel or navy captain.53 These limits were repealed in 
1967 during the Vietnam War. 
 
In 1973, American involvement in Vietnam ended and societal imperatives impelled the 
shift to an all-volunteer force.54 At the time, less than 1 percent of personnel were 
women and 14 percent of enlisted and 2.4 percent of officers were Black.55 Fears that “a 
volunteer force during wartime would be mercenary, composed mostly of the poor, 
black, and uneducated”56 were well-founded: the percentage of Blacks in the military 
rose to 26 percent in 1979, including 37 percent in the Army.57 Proportions normalized 
over the next two decades, although Blacks remain over-represented in the enlisted 
forces by 6 to 10 percent and have been equally represented in the officer corps since 
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1997.58 The percentage of women increased from less than 1 percent in 1973 to 8 
percent in 1980, 12 percent in 1990, 19.5 percent in 2000, and 21 percent in 2010.59 
Among NATO countries, the American military has proportionally more women than 
any other. 
 
These vast increases in Black and female participation have been achieved through a 
combination of approaches that attempted to provide for equality of opportunity as well 
as equality of outcomes. Racial integration was based on maintaining standards, 
increasing human capital, and preference at the margins. Throughout the 1970s until 
2000, the U.S. military followed a policy of setting goals for the admission and 
promotion of racial and ethnic minorities and adopted mechanisms of “affirmative 
action” to achieve those goals.60 Regarding these objectives, “promotion boards were to 
select minority members equivalent to the percentage in the promotion pool,” rather 
than in proportion to the rank, service, military, or civilian population.61 To achieve 
these goals, the top and bottom portions of the distribution were identified without 
regard to race or ethnicity and treated appropriately. In the middle of the “rack and 
stack” among “micromillimeter differences” in service records is where demographic 
considerations came into play and deviations from the pool’s proportions required 
justification.62 Thus, as one Army officer explained, “Only fully qualified people are 
promoted, but not necessarily the best-qualified” among this mid-range.63  
 
Such a scheme depends on a large pool of qualified minority candidates. The services 
adopted initiatives to develop the capabilities of all service members. “The Army has 
successfully introduced programs to bring young people up to enlistment standards, to 
raise enlisted soldiers up to noncommissioned officer standards, to bring black 
undergraduates up to officer commissioning standards and to raise high school 
graduates up to West Point admission standards.”64 These include Junior Reserve 
Officer Training Corps (JROTC) detachments in high schools,65 Functional Academic 
Skills Training (FAST) to increase the reading and math skills of enlisted personnel, and 
military service academy preparatory schools.66 If racial and ethnic minorities were 
more likely to be urged to take advantage of these development programs and did so at 
a rate greater than their share of the force, that was quite acceptable. The result was a 
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gradual increase in the percentage of racial and ethnic minorities throughout all ranks 
and most occupational specialties.67  
 
There was some resistance to this system of preferences, including successful lawsuits 
brought by white male officers passed over for promotion.68 Yet policy had borne 
sufficient fruit: in 2002, a federal judge found that the instructions given to promotion 
boards were unconstitutional because “Army hiring reports from the 1970s, 1980s, and 
1990s showed that racial discrimination in officer proportion had largely disappeared 
over time.”69 
 
On the other hand, a less thorough policy of equal opportunity mixed with equality of 
outcomes has greatly increased the percentage of women, but their participation has 
plateaued short of proportional representation. In part, this is because the United States 
military has adopted different standards for men and women in the armed forces, has 
not directly invested in increasing female human capital, and has given preferential 
treatment.70 These practices were most evident in two areas: physical fitness standards 
were lowered, separate standards for men and women were adopted,71 and women 
were excluded from the combat arms career fields that are most correlated with career 
progression.72 The result has been an interconnecting series of negative outcomes 
within the success of increased numbers. 
 
First, the exclusion of women from combat contributed to perceptions that women are 
not true members of the armed forces.73 This perception is reinforced by differential 
fitness standards. Furthermore, exclusion from combat has prevented women from 
pursuing career paths that would lead to command and leadership positions. In 2006, 
for instance, 80 percent of general officers in the U.S. Army came from the combat 
units.74 The lack of female commanders further fuels perceptions of women as inferior 
members of the armed forces. It also contributes to a third problem, that of sexual 
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harassment and assault in the ranks.75 The overall result of these policies has been that 
gender integration across ranks and occupational specialties in the U.S. military has 
reached a plateau with occasional steps to increase positions open to women.76 
 
Perhaps more importantly, American policy has been most comprehensive in providing 
decision makers with the data necessary to establish goals, assess progress, and alter 
policy as needed. In particular, the Department of Defense reports demographic 
information in accession programs by type, commissioning source, and program; the 
composition of the active duty and reserve forces; promotions; admission to 
professional military education programs; separations – in particular involuntary 
separations; career assignment; discrimination and harassment complaints; and 
disciplinary actions under the UCMJ.77 The Department of Defense makes much of this 
information available to the public so that various stakeholders can utilize it to assess 
its policies.78 
 
Likewise, the Department of Defense has undertaken longitudinal studies of attitudes 
among youth to military service – both in their prospective motivations to join or their 
retrospective rationales for joining.79 This research has shown that the propensity to 
serve varies over time, differs among subgroups, and has captured different motivations 
for service. Utilizing such data to understand the larger mosaic can permit the 
construction of detailed recruitment and professional development programs that can 
best meet potential recruits’ career desires, thereby maximizing their likelihood to 
volunteer, remain, and be satisfied with their choice in the military.  
 
Overall, the United States military has pursued policies of equal opportunity as well as 
policies that pursued equal outcomes to overcome substantial historical and cultural 
barriers to achieve the most diverse armed forces personnel in the world. It moved 
from policies of exclusion to segregated inclusion in times of war, when the functional 
imperative dominated the societal. It then integrated these groups – Blacks and women 
– into the armed forces. The end of conscription led to substantial increases in the 
participation of members of these groups. Their retention was assisted by policies that 
made it more likely that they would be successful, from education and training to favor 
in promotions to overcome the disadvantages of previous discrimination. By 2012, the 
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United States military had a higher percentage of women and racial minorities than any 
other NATO country.80 And it achieved this end through a manpower acquisition system 
designed to maximize its functional imperative: a professional, all-volunteer force. 
 
 
The United Kingdom 
The United Kingdom has addressed numerous challenges in its attempts to diversify its 
armed forces along gender, ethnic, and racial lines. Britain’s transition from an imperial 
power to a member of the European Union has affected the manner in which it deals 
with these issues. After addressing issues of class critical to establishing its all-volunteer 
force, it pursued parallel efforts toward women and racial and ethnic minorities, that 
have continued to the present. These policies emphasized equal opportunity and 
resisted some pressures to use other means to achieve equal outcomes. 
 
British efforts to diversify its armed forces began with the re-adoption of an all-
volunteer force in 1962. Its focus was on socio-economic class, as the distinctions 
between officers and enlisted men reified the class structure of British society and 
constituted a significant barrier to recruitment.81 Officer recruitment in particular 
proved challenging and “strenuous efforts were made … to attract commissions from as 
wide a social base as possible,” including from state-sector schools, middle-class 
backgrounds, families whose fathers had not been officers, and from the enlisted 
ranks.82 Improvements were obtained “partly by making the conditions of entry into the 
office corps as varied and flexible as possible … through the creation of various types of 
commissions which had different standards and modes of entry.”83 But the biggest 
barrier was one of identity. “The increasing number of applicants who lacked the 
characteristics customarily associated with the British officer corps presented 
difficulties for those concerned with the selection and training of officers” that required 
a “reappraisal of selection and training methods.”84 This reappraisal emphasized the 
meritocratic and professional nature of the officer corps at the expense of its presumed 
social status. Yet these efforts at providing equal opportunity had, at best, a temporary 
effect. Forty years later, the House of Commons found that over half of the cadets 
selected to attend Sandhurst had graduated from independent schools, whereas 58 
percent of Army officers, 70 percent of Navy officers, and 75 percent of Air Force 
officers selected to attend the Advanced Command and Staff Course had attended state 
schools.85 It concluded that “the Department collects and monitors information on many 
aspects of diversity, but does not do so for social and educational background and 
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cannot therefore be sure whether the Armed Forces are truly representative of the 
society they defend.”86 
 
This earlier effort set the conditions for the inclusion of women and ethnic minorities in 
the British armed forces. These efforts have been philosophically bifurcated. The 
inclusion of women has been framed as securing equality of opportunity, and the 
inclusion of ethnic minorities has been framed as obtaining equality of outcomes even 
as the same sorts of policies have been pursued for each.  
 
Women have long served in the British Armed forces, albeit in a segregated women’s 
corps. The first move to provide equal opportunity for women to serve was the 
integration of their separate corps into the Royal Air Force (RAF) in 1949 and the Army 
in 1980. Still, within the services, women were relegated to certain career fields and 
barred from others. These barriers were incrementally addressed – and continue to be 
removed today. Women were permitted to pilot aircraft in 1980 and deployed to a 
combat theater for the first time in 1990.87 The percentage of posts available to women 
continued to increase thereafter: 96 percent of RAF posts, 71 percent of posts in the 
Royal Navy, 73 percent in the Royal Marines, and 67 percent of posts in the Army as of 
2006.88  
 
Because the problem of gender diversity has been framed as one of equal opportunity, 
women have not been specifically targeted for recruitment. It is accepted that men and 
women have different propensities to serve in the military. Given this, the MoD has not 
set specific targets for women in the forces. The percentage of women joining the armed 
forces has declined over the past decade, from 11.3 percent joining in 2000/01 to 8.8 
percent in 2010/11.89 Still, the overall numbers of women in the forces continued to 
rise, as seen in Table 1. 
 
 
Table 1: Percentage of Women in the Active Duty Armed Forces90 
 2000 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Officers 8.9 10.9 11.3 11.6 11.9 12.1 12.2 12.3 
Enlisted 7.8 8.7 8.7 8.8 8.9 8.9 9.0 9.0 
Total 8.0 9.0 9.1 9.3 9.4 9.5 9.6 9.6 
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This increase can be credited to increased retention of female personnel, despite gender 
differences contributing to shorter lengths of service.91 Until 1990, women were 
required to leave the armed forces upon becoming pregnant.92 Maternity leave and anti-
harassment policies undertaken under the 1998 Defence White Paper have been 
reinforced over time and have contributed to greater retention rates. Indeed, the 
increase in the percentage of females in the regular armed forces suggests that the rate 
of attrition is less than that of accession. This is borne out, as can be seen in Table 2: the 
outflow of females declined by 1–2 percent over the course to the 2000s. 
 
Table 2: Percentage of Women Leaving the UK Armed Forces93 
 2000/01 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 
Officers 11.1 10.7 11.0 12.4 12.7 11.5 12.2 
Enlisted 9.6 8.3 8.3 8.4 8.3 7.5 8.4 
Total 9.7 8.5 8.6 8.9 8.8 7.9 8.8 
 
Diversifying the British armed forces along racial and ethnic lines94 has also been based 
on equal opportunity, although diversity is often assessed as though it was based upon 
achieving equality of outcomes. Britain’s history as a colonial power has provided vast 
experience with utilizing non-white, Anglo-Saxon males in its volunteer armed forces. 
Given its penchant for a small land force, the British provided officers to command 
indigenous forces to police and defend their colonial holdings. As such, these forces 
were separate from the core of the British military, properly conceived. Functionally, 
this separation worked well but has had an effect on the British armed forces as it has 
diversified over the past fifteen years. As Dandeker and Mason argue:  
 
The recent forebears of many of Britain’s citizens who are not white were 
either enemies or colonial subjects. In these circumstances, it may be 
difficult to view their descendants as co-nationals – whatever their formal 
citizenship – because they lack both the common origins and the ethnic 
homogeneity which the British national myth … requires.95  
 
Yet their presence is increasing. From 2001 to 2009, members of these non-White 
groups increased from 8.82 to 12.096 percent of the British population.97  
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As when addressing social class and gender, British authorities framed the participation 
of ethnic minorities in terms of equal opportunity. The Race Relations Act of 1976 made 
discrimination illegal but did not require positive steps be taken to overcome past 
discrimination. These policies and the metrics of nondiscrimination in recruitment and 
promotion policies continued through the 1990s. During this period, however, policies 
based upon equal opportunity came to be judged in terms of outcomes measured in 
terms of proportional representation.98 Such an approach justifies “positive 
discrimination” to rectify previous imbalances.99 Against this trend, the 1998 Strategic 
Defence Review retained an equal opportunity approach to racial and ethnic diversity 
even as it accepted that the British armed forces “should better reflect the ethnic 
composition of the British population.”100 It set a goal of 2 percent of the recruits being 
of ethnic minority stock.101 It also decided to increase that goal by 1 percent each year 
until “eventually, the composition of our Armed Forces reflects that of the population as 
a whole.”102 To further this goal, the MoD sought to accommodate religious and cultural 
differences when possible to deepen the conception of equal opportunity rather than 
adopting a program of “positive discrimination” to achieve equal outcomes more 
quickly. 
 
The 2001 Race Relations Amendment Act formally shifted the frame from equal 
opportunity to equality of outcomes. It required the British military “to take positive 
steps not only to eliminate discrimination but also to promote racial equality.”103 In 
response, the MoD re-emphasized equal opportunity. Its Race Equality Scheme for 
2002–2005 set out to “achieve an environment free from harassment, intimidation and 
unlawful discrimination, in which all have equal opportunity and encouragement to 
realise their full potential” and “increasee the number of ethnic minorities at all ranks in 
the Armed Forces.”104 It set a goal of 2.8 percent of the active force to be ethnic 
minorities by 2006 while reducing the ambition of annually increasing ethnic minority 
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recruitment to a more reasonable 0.5 percent.105 As seen in Table 3, the British 
increased their recruitment of Blacks and ethnic minorities and reached their objectives 
for 2006. 
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In 2006, the MoD set “a target to increase the proportion of black and ethnic minority 
personnel in the Armed Forces to 8% of all personnel by 2013.”107 The 2008 Equality 
and Diversity Scheme subsumed the Race Equality Scheme and included other minority 
groups, including women.108 It set no objectives for either recruitment or overall 
representation levels for ethnic minorities – perhaps because the MoD had already set 
its own objectives and was on its way to achieving it, primarily through the swelling of 
the enlisted ranks, as seen in Table 4. Although there has been a steady increase, the 
rate of 0.2–0.3 percent per year indicates that the current policy mix will not allow the 
British military to reach its goal of 8 percent ethnic minorities in the regular forces by 
2013. 
 
Table 4: Percentage of Black and Ethnic Minorities in  
the Active Duty Armed Forces109 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Officers 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.4 2.4 
Enlisted 5.8 6.1 6.5 6.7 7.3 7.4 7.6 
Total 4.9 5.2 5.5 5.7 6.1 6.3 6.6 
 
Overall, the British military has overcome substantial historical and cultural barriers to 
become one of the most diverse armed forces in the world. It relied upon policies of 
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segregated inclusion in times of war, when the functional imperative dominated the 
societal imperatives, and then slowly integrated these groups – ethnic minorities and 
women – into the peacetime armed forces through the recruitment mechanisms of an 
all-volunteer force. The services retained substantial autonomy over their manpower 
policies, which allowed significant differences in attitudes toward minority groups to 
drive policy. An emphasis on equal opportunity rather than equal outcomes, fairly 
realistic recruiting goals for ethnic minorities, and increased retention of women have 
increased the representation of both groups. By 2012, the British armed forces ranked 
third in the percentage of women and third in the percentage of racial minorities 




Canada has been a heterogeneous country with an all-volunteer force since its founding. 
It has faced numerous challenges integrating Francophones into the Canadian Forces 
(CF) and has built upon these efforts in recent decades to include women, “visible 
minorities,” and Aboriginal peoples. After its long-standing policy of assimilation 
became problematic, the CF’s policies emphasized equal outcomes for Francophones 
and then shifted toward equal opportunity for other groups. 
 
Perhaps the greatest challenge facing the CF had been accommodating its Francophone 
minority within the force. Canada has long endured the legacy of its origins as a 
federation of French and Anglo settlements and used the military to foster unity and 
loyalty to the Canadian state as an Anglo entity. Francophones were compelled to use 
English until the Canadian government decided to make its institutions bilingual and the 
first Francophone, Jean Victor Allard, was appointed Chief of the Defence Staff in July 
1966. The CF established bilingual infrastructures so that CF units could communicate 
in both languages.110 As of 1969, the CF pursued two policies to integrate Francophones: 
targeted recruitment and promotion and bilingualism. It was decided in 1971 that 
proportionality of Francophones would be achieved across all ranks and occupational 
specialties within 15 years,111 and the CF developed a long-term plan requiring all 
officers, warrant officers, and sergeants be functionally bilingual by 1980.112 These 
plans were based upon equality of outcome rather than equal opportunity. 
 
In terms of recruitment, the CF determined that recruiters would have to target 
Francophones out of proportion to their numbers in the Canadian population to quickly 
swell the ranks and build their number across specialties and ranks.113 Their focus was 
primarily on officers. Indeed, “the question of recruiting privates was not considered, 
since the suggested quotas were filled fairly easily.”114 Thus it was decided that “for the 
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1970–71 fiscal year, 50 percent of officer cadets in the Direct Officer Entry Plan (DOEP) 
would be Francophones.”115 The 50 percent quota continued until 1979, when it was 
lowered to 35 percent for career fields in which Francophones were severely under-
represented.116 
 
Yet Francophone recruitment was only the first hurdle. “It was once they were in the 
Forces that things went wrong for the Francophones.”117 Problems arose for 
Francophones because they were required to operate in a professional environment in 
which English was the working language. They were generally a year behind their 
Anglophone peers given the need for language training and, even then, their language 
skills proved detrimental to their career progression. Moreover, Francophones were 
traditionally drawn to the infantry and not to most other career fields, leading to 
significant efforts to redirect Francophones into fields beyond their initial interest. 
 
In order to accomplish proportionality throughout the ranks, several schemes were 
considered.118 The CF chose to utilize selective deviations from merit-based promotions 
to ensure sufficient Francophones were gradually promoted through the ranks, with 
increasing annual targets set for each rank and specialty. Unlike U.S. practice, however, 
Anglophones who were specifically passed over for promotion in favor of a 
Francophone “would automatically be placed at the top of the next promotion list and 
promoted at the first opportunity.”119 Although such “deviations” constituted between 
2.5 and 3 percent of promotions each year,120 the practice had the unfortunate effect of 
undermining the credibility of the promotion system and reducing morale as “hundreds 
of persons continued to believe they had been passed over in favor of a less qualified 
Francophone … and several Francophones … were told outright … that they had been 
promoted because they were Francophones.”121 
 
This formula was used from 1972 until 1987, when it was challenged and amended to 
broaden the basis of deviations from language to “skill and knowledge” appropriate for 
the position.122 As shown in Table 5, focused recruitment, quotas, and preferential 
promotions did steadily increase the proportion of Francophones throughout the ranks 
of the CF. 
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Table 5: Percentage of Francophones in the CF123 
 1966 1970 1974 1978 1982 1987 1992 1997 2002 2007 2010 
Officers 9.4 10.7 16.5 19.3 21.6 22.3 24.0 25.0 25.0 24.2 22.8 
Enlisted 17.0 19.0 22.8 25.4 28.2 28.3 29.0 28.5 28.0 28.6 27.8 
Total 15.8 17.6 21.6 24.3 26.9 27.1 27.5 27.5 27.0 27.0 26.6 
 
When discontinued in November 1987, Francophones constituted 27.09 percent of the 
CF en toto (28.32 percent of enlisted and 22.32 percent of officers), compared to 24.91 
percent of the Canadian population as a whole.124 By the 2000s, Francophones 
remained represented almost in proportion with their percentage in the Canadian 
civilian population, which was 28.1 percent in the 2006 census.125 
 
The Canadian Forces also pursued a policy of bilingual training in order to facilitate 
integration and to reduce inequities in promotion and retention decisions. In 1988, the 
CF adopted a universal approach to bilingualism for all personnel. The CF pursued this 
policy successfully for two decades to great success. As seen in Table 6, the percentage 
of bilingual Francophone officers and enlisted members, as well as Anglophone officers, 
has increased substantially since 1991, while the percentage of bilingual Anglophone 
enlisted members has not. 
 
Table 6. Bilingual CF Members126 
 1991 1996 2001 2006 2010 
% Bilingual Francophone Officers 27.0 80.0 91.0 91.0 87.0 
% Bilingual Anglophone Officers 20.0 46.0 62.0 68.0 63.0 
% Bilingual Francophone Enlisted 19.5 50.0 65.0 61.0 56.0 
% Bilingual Anglophone Enlisted 3.0 7.0 9.5 9.5 8.0 
 
The CF viewed its success as “over-compliance” with the Act.127 In April 2007, it altered 
its policy to ensure only that “National Defence personnel are led, trained, administered 
and supported in their official language of choice.”128 In essence, it aimed to move 
bilingualism from the individual level to the unit level, effectively alleviating the CF of 
the requirement to train all of its members in their nonofficial language within the first 
few years of their career. 
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The societal imperative of inclusion has been extended to gender, “visible minorities,” 
and Aboriginal peoples. Women were permitted to serve in the CF beginning in 1951, 
albeit with a 1.5 percent limit on their numbers and restrictions on their career fields.129 
The 1978 Human Rights Act prohibited such discrimination and “by 1985, women were 
allowed in 75% of military occupations.”130 “In 1989, the CF was directed by a Canadian 
Human Rights Tribunal to remove gender-based employment barriers and to achieve 
the complete integration of women into all occupational and employment areas within 
ten years.”131 This opened all positions in the military to women, including combat-
related positions.132 Indeed, “Canada was the first NATO country to open all occupations 
to women, although other countries such as Norway, Denmark and Belgium have since 
followed.”133 
 
Nonetheless, from 1989 to 1998 there was less than a one percent increase in women in 
the regular force, with half of a percent increase in the NCO corps and a 2.5 percent 
increase among officers.134 In 1999, the CF established a goal of recruiting 28 percent 
for women by 2019. Efforts to increase recruitment through targeted campaigns 
throughout the 2000s improved female representation,135 as seen in Table 7. 
 
Table 7: Percentage of Female CF Members136 
 1991 1996 2001 2006 2010 
Officers 10.0 11.0 13.0 15.0 17.0 
Enlisted 11.0 11.0 11.5 12.0 12.5 
Total 11.0 11.0 12.0 12.5 13.0 
 
These results were achieved without quotas, such as those used to rapidly increase the 
representation of Francophones, as quotas were prohibited by the Employment Equity 
Act of 1996. The focus was on recruiting “the best candidate – whether man or 
woman.”137 Canadian emphasis on increasing the proportion of females in the force 
through equal opportunities in recruitment and promotion has slowed the rate at which 
                                                          
129
 Lise Bourgon, ”The CF as an Employer of Choice: The Key for a Successful Gender Integration,” (paper 
prepared for the Canadian Forces College, 19 April 2007), pages 6–7. 
130
 Bourgon, ”The CF as an Employer of Choice,” page 7. 
131
 Chief Review Services, Evaluation—Gender Integration in the CF (Ottawa: Ministry of Defence, June 1998, 
Revised November 1998), synopsis. 
132
 Donna Winslow, Phyllis Browne, and Angela Febbraro, ”Diversity in the Canadian Forces,” in Joseph Soeters 
and Jan van der Meulen, editors, Cultural Diversity in the Armed Forces: An International Comparison (London: 
Routledge, 2007), page 33.  
133
 Chief Review Services, Evaluation—Gender Integration in the CF, page ii. 
134
 Chief Review Services, Evaluation—Gender Integration in the CF, page ii. 
135
 Helena Carreiras, Gender and the Military: Women in the Armed Forces of Western Democracies (London: 
Routledge, 2006), page 104. 
136
 Derived from Workforce Modeling and Analysis Team, Annual Report on Regular Force Personnel 
2009/2010, page 19, Figure 20. Winslow, Browne, and Febbraro, ”Diversity in the Canadian Forces,” page 35 
reported that the CF’s “Self-Identification Census” indicated that 16 percent of CF members were women, 
making up 23.3 percent of the officer corps and 10.7 percent of non-commissioned members in 2001, but 
these figures have been superseded by an actual count by the Canadian Human Resource Management 
System. 
137
 Chief Review Services, Evaluation—Gender Integration in the CF, page i. 




the ranks of the officer and NCO corps can be populated by females, as seen in Tables 8 
and 9. 
 
Table 8: Percentage of Female Officers by Rank, 2006–2010138 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
General Officer 3.9 4.9 3.8 2.4 2.2 
Colonel 4.0 4.0 4.0 3.7 3.6 
Lieutenant Colonel 6.4 7.0 7.2 7.6 8.1 
Major 10.3 11.1 12.2 13.2 13.8 
Captain 15.7 16.5 16.2 16.8 17.3 
Lieutenant 22.4 24.8 27.5 23.8 23.5 
2nd Lieutenant 19.2 16.7 15.5 17.9 14.9 
Cadet 21.8 21.4 22.2 21.6 22.9 
Total 15.0 15.5 15.9 16.3 16.5 
 
 
Table 9: Percentage of Female Enlisted by Rank, 2006–2010139 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Chief Warrant Officer 4.1 4.1 4.2 5.4 4.9 
Master Warrant Officer 6.0 6.3 6.1 6.4 7.0 
Warrant Officer 7.8 8.6 8.9 8.6 9.1 
Sergeant 11.4 11.8 12.3 13.0 13.8 
Master Corporal 12.9 14.1 14.5 14.9 14.7 
Corporal 13.5 13.5 13.6 13.6 13.5 
Private 14.0 13.6 13.6 13.6 12.9 
Total 12.4 12.6 12.8 13.0 12.9 
 
The Employment Equity Act of 1996 also applied to Aboriginal peoples140 and “visible 
minorities.”141 Policies of equal opportunity were applied to each. 
 
“Visible minorities” faced explicit discrimination in the CF. The Navy and Air Force 
prohibited them from service until 1943.142 Little was done beyond allowing them to 
serve until 1997, when, in response to the Employment Equity Act of 1996, the CF set a 
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goal to recruit 9 percent “visible minorities” by 2019.143 In part due to focused 
recruitment efforts, the percentage of “visible minorities” in the CF increased six-fold 
from 1991–2010, as indicated in Table 10. 
 
Table 10: Percentage of “Visible Minority” CF Members144 
 1991 1996 2001 2006 2010 
Officers 0.7 1.1 2.0 2.7 5.6 
Enlisted 0.5 1.0 1.3 2.1 3.1 
Total 0.6 1.0 1.4 2.0 3.5 
 
Finally, Aboriginal people pose particular challenges. The settlement of the “New 
World” by European immigrants destroyed Aboriginal peoples and their cultures over 
the course of centuries. “Politically, Aboriginal people were marginalized and forced 
from their home territories, put on reserves, and excluded from the economic 
mainstream … Accordingly, Aboriginal nations descended into poverty and became 
dependent on the Canadian government for subsistence.”145 The Canadian government 
has adopted specific policies designed to increase the educational level of Aboriginal 
peoples, among other policies, so as to help redress this damage.146 In 1999, the CF set a 
goal for Aboriginal peoples to constitute 3 percent of all recruits by 2019,147 which was 
roughly their share of the population in the 2000 census.148 The percentage of 
Aboriginal peoples in the CF from 1991–2010 is indicated in Table 12. Given the 
trajectory of these figures, it would appear as though the CF will not achieve its 
objective without greater efforts. 
 
Table 11: Percentage of Aboriginal CF Members149 
 1991 1996 2001 2006 2010 
Officers 0.4 0.5 0.8 0.9 1.5 
Enlisted 1.0 1.3 2.1 2.1 2.3 
Total 0.9 1.2 1.9 2 2.1 
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Overall, the Canadian military has overcome substantial historical and cultural barriers 
to achieve the second-most diverse armed forces population in NATO. It moved from 
policies of forcible assimilation and the marginalization of Francophones, albeit within a 
volunteer military, toward promoting bilingualism and policies favoring Francophones 
until they were proportionally represented. Policies designed to achieve rapid equality 
of outcomes were problematic, however, and emphasis shifted to equal opportunity to 
address women, “visible minorities,” and Aboriginals. The Canadian Forces took the 
lead in integrating women. This process was accelerated through legislative and judicial 
edicts requiring the adoption of equal opportunity policies. Societal imperatives also 
drove efforts to integrate “visible minorities” and Aboriginal peoples into the CF. The 
proportions of all three of these legislatively “Designated Groups” have been increased 
through focused recruitment efforts. By 2012, the Canadian Forces were among the 
most diverse among the NATO nations, which was achieved through a manpower 




Mechanisms for Sharing 
These three countries have extensive experience with integrating ethnic, racial, and 
linguistic minorities into their armed forces. These experiences informed their efforts of 
gender integration, with all three countries outpacing the Nordic countries of Norway, 
Sweden, and Denmark. Remarkably, their policies have developed independently, with 
only informal reference made to one another’s experiences. For instance, the U.S. 
Diversity Leadership Commission’s Report of 2011 contains no reference to the 
experiences of Canada or Great Britain.150 The report of the U.S. Congressional Research 
Service on issues pertaining to women in combat only references a press account of a 
Canadian study on the topic.151 Comparisons are equally weak among the Nordic 
countries. The only reference found to the experiences of other Nordic countries was a 
Norwegian survey of private sector diversity practices in Denmark.152 
 
Opportunities for cross-national learning do exist, however. NATO has several 
mechanisms at its disposal allowing alliance members to collect data, provide and share 
information regarding national programs, policies, and procedures on gender-related 
issues, including the implementation of UNSCRs 1325 (2000), 1820 (2008), 1888 
(2009), 1889 (2009), and 1960 (2010). These include task forces, working groups, and 
committees of experts.153 
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The mechanisms are thus in place for sharing lessons and improving the integration of 
women and ethnic minorities into the armed forces of NATO counties. Denmark 
participates in these forums to achieve its objectives of “greater, active participation of 
women in peace building at international and local levels,” as well as objectives outlined 
in its National Action Plan for Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 
on Women, Peace and Security.154 Its advocacy of such objectives should be tempered 
by the recognition that other Allies are more successful at integrating women—and 
ethnic minorities—into their armed forces. 
 
 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
The Danish Armed Forces are undergoing a transformation as they respond to the 
functional imperatives of becoming a smaller, more professional expeditionary force 
that can better contribute to NATO missions. They are also being transformed by a 
commitment to reflect the composition of Danish society. Danish diversity policy has 
focused on issues of gender equality, a Scandinavian strength, and has only recently 
begun to address the changing ethnic make-up of Danish society. As such, it has made 
some strides with regard to gender diversity, opening all positions to women and 
ranking 11th among NATO countries in terms of the percentage of the force composed 
by women. It has yet to achieve comparable success with ethnic minorities. 
 
What conclusions can be drawn from this survey of Danish, Norwegian, Swedish, 
American, British, and Canadian policies? Five conclusions are clear: 
 
1. Diversity is a societal imperative 
2. Systematic data reporting is imperative to success 
3. Lofty goals can be counterproductive 
4. Focused development, recruitment, promotion, and retention policies are key 
5. Volunteer forces are more diverse than conscript forces 
 
Diversity is a societal imperative 
Changing societal norms regarding gender relations and the increased presence of 
ethnic minorities have made diversity in all public agencies a metric of legitimacy. All 
must bear responsibility for the functioning of the state and society. Virtually every 
NATO member has moved to include more women and ethnic minorities in their armed 
forces. The context differs across countries, with different groups posing the primary 
challenge to be overcome. In the United States, Blacks were the primary group whose 
process of integration formed the basis for integrating women and other ethnic 
minorities. In Canada, Francophones were the most challenging group to integrate, with 
women, “visible minorities,” and Aboriginal peoples included afterwards. In Great 
Britain, policies to include ethnic minorities and women followed efforts to broaden the 
socio-economic basis of the officer corps that have only recently begun to merge. 
Although these three countries have not given women pride of place in their diversity 
efforts, they nevertheless have the greatest proportion of women in their armed forces 
amongst the NATO countries. 
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Systematic data reporting is imperative to success 
It is difficult, if not impossible, to set goals, monitor progress, and adjust policies 
without access to appropriate data. Personnel data are amongst the easiest to collect, 
collate, and analyze. The United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada produce annual 
(and in the British case, quarterly) reports describing the status of their armed forces: 
total manpower, accessions, and separations, broken down by service, component, rank, 
and relevant demographic variables such as age, gender, race, ethnicity, primary 
language, and marital status. These studies also compare these descriptive statistics to 
those of the civilian population, both en toto and in comparison to the civilian work 
force. These reports are made public so that relevant stakeholders and interested 
parties can use reliable data as they monitor compliance by their governments. As the 
British put it, “The Armed Forces ensure public access to information and services 
which they provide by making these accessible to everyone.”155 Regular 
institutionalized reporting of data to all stake holders, including the legislature and civil 
society, should be undertaken by the Danish MoD. 
 
These compendiums can be complemented by analyses of promotion rates, command 
selection, and assignment patterns so that progress of groups of interest can be tracked 
and systemic deviations from the norm can be investigated.156 As the British Ministry of 
Defence states, “We gather, analyse and evaluate information to determine any patterns 
of inequality. This analysis is carried out across the whole spectrum of employment in 
the Armed Forces, from joining up to leaving service.”157 In addition, these governments 
survey the attitudes of service members to evaluate the cultural context within which 
policy initiatives are taking place, identify potential issues and challenges, and provide a 
basis for overcoming them.158 The Danish MoD should follow suit. 
 
Lofty goals can be counterproductive 
The British and Canadian armed forces set goals for increasing the percentage of 
designated minority groups recruited and in the force as a whole when adopting their 
respective diversity and integration initiatives. These objectives garnered plaudits 
when announced. They later had to scale back their ambitions and paid a price when 
doing so.159 The Canadians learned a valuable lesson from these failures to meet their 
objectives. Canada has repeatedly adjusted its recruiting targets to take into account 
propensity to serve. This has allowed it to avoid setting unrealistic expectations, such as 
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recruiting sufficient numbers of women to make the CF 50 percent female in any 
reasonable timeframe. The Danish MoD should use similar analyses to set achievable 
goals for recruiting, retaining, and promoting women and ethnic minorities in the DAF. 
 
Focused development, recruitment, promotion, and retention policies are key 
Great Britain and Canada have had success in recruiting minorities when they are 
targeted, be they women or members of ethnic or linguistic minority groups. The United 
States has also targeted minority groups for recruitment, but it has also developed 
programs to augment the qualifications of minority group members so as to increase 
the pool of qualified applicants. This approach has been most successful. 
 
The Danish MoD should do more than “examine in collaboration with civil sports 
country high schools to offer a sports course that prepares women and men for a future 
military career.”160 Programs for developing the human capital of potential recruitment 
pools should include education and vocational programs so as to increase the quality of 
personnel in the force and offer inducements to join. 
 
The United States and Canada have also carried out numerous studies of the propensity 
of youth to enlist in the armed forces. Such studies control for numerous factors beyond 
gross demographics, such as family socio-economic status and occupational 
preferences, to determine the probability of youths from different groups electing to 
serve in the armed forces, their occupational preferences, and expected length of 
service. The Danish MoD should undertake such studies to improve its capacity to set 
and then achieve realistic goals. 
 
The American experience suggests that members of different groups join the armed 
forces for different reasons: to serve the nation, learn a trade, further their education, 
demonstrate their patriotism, and so forth. Recognizing these differentiated career 
expectations may offer a means by which to increase the propensity to join and remain 
in the armed forces. Women and ethnic minorities must see the armed forces as an 
attractive career option. The MoD should study “options for further differentiated 
career tracks to … visualize different job types and career paths. Both men and women 
should be able to see attractive career paths in the military,”161 regardless of their 
ethnicity. 
 
Yet recruitment changes the composition of the armed forces slowly, and only at the 
lower levels given the lack of lateral entry. Increasing diversity through recruitment and 
retention therefore requires patience. Indeed, recruitment rates must be greater than 
the attrition of members of targeted groups if growth in their proportion of the force is 
to occur. 
 
Retention therefore requires significant attention. Many diversity policies first establish 
a harassment-free work environment. This is necessary to enhance retention rates. 
Other problems may exist, however, which exploration through systematically applied 
exit interviews may uncover. For instance, “Interview surveys with female soldiers who 
stop their military training, among others, indicate the main reason for female dropout 
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is the physical challenges.”162 Such interviews should be conducted for all personnel, 
regardless of time in service or rank. 
 
The experience of the United States and Canada suggests that training and education 
programs that develop the skills and knowledge of personnel are crucial to retaining a 
pool of capable minorities able to advance through a meritocratic system and avoiding 
premature attrition. Such programs may ostensibly be open to all but be designed to 
benefit members of groups that are more likely to lack certain qualifications. It would 
appear as though the FOCUS program begun in 2007 could provide the basis for 
developing the DAF’s human capital. 
 
Along these lines, the experience of the United States and Canada suggests that the most 
effective means of increasing the proportion of designated minority group members 
across ranks and career fields is to provide them with advantages in promotions. In 
each case, goals or quotas for members of these groups were established for cohorts 
appearing before a promotion board. Members of these groups were given a preference, 
either directly or indirectly, so that diversity objectives could be reached. In both cases, 
the integrity of the promotion system was compromised, resentment for members of 
the designated minority groups was fostered, and ultimately targeted preferences were 
deemed illegal. These practices were therefore either discontinued or significantly 
modified to account for skills, knowledge, or experiences that may be unevenly 
distributed across demographic groups. In 2004, the Danish government set formal 
targets of 4 percent for ethnic minorities in all government departments. Such goals 
may encourage policies that expedite the recruitment and retention of ethnic minorities 
but may come at substantial cost. Utilizing a system of preferences in promotion 
decisions is contrary to other fundamental values – indeed, would be prohibited by EU 
Directives 2006/54/EC, 2000/48/EC, and 2000/78/EC – and should be avoided. 
 
Volunteer forces are more diverse than conscript forces 
It is generally argued that the functional and societal imperatives of the military are in 
tension and that increasing the former reduces the latter.163 The professionalization of 
the military, beginning with the officer corps, through non-commissioned officers, and 
today reaching even the enlisted ranks,164 subordinated the societal imperative of 
representation to the functional imperative of effectiveness. Voluntary and merit-based 
entry, retention, and promotion structures provide for long-term careers and continued 
professional development while conscripted forces provide short-term service that 
ideally rotates a majority of citizens through the military. A conscript force is not 
professional and its personnel cannot be trained and educated beyond a rudimentary 
level. In essence, a professional force is selective in its personnel policies and effective in 
its performance, whereas a conscripted force is inclusive but less effective. 
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Interestingly, the evidence suggests that a selective volunteer force is also more 
representative than a conscripted one. 
 
The case for moving from conscription to an all-volunteer force is generally based upon 
a philosophical emphasis upon freedom of choice for citizens, macro-economic 
efficiency, and developing a professional force of career-oriented personnel whose time 
in service will permit the acquisition of the depth and breadth of knowledge and 
expertise necessary to be effective in the current international environment.165 It is 
presumed that females and ethnic minorities will be less likely than males of the 
dominant racial/ethnic/linguistic group to enlist. Although studies of enlistment 
propensity bear this out,166 NATO militaries with all-volunteer forces tend to have the 
greatest proportion of females – far outpacing nations that acquire manpower through 
conscription (and allow women to volunteer).167 Indeed, the data suggests that shifting 
to an all-volunteer force is accompanied by an increase in female and ethnic and racial 
minority participation.168 Indeed, in Sweden’s first year of transitioning to an AVF, 13.9 
percent of the applicants were female and 9 percent were not of Swedish origin.169 
Perhaps this is because a mix of compulsory male conscription and voluntary female 
enlistment emphasizes the perception that the military constitutes “man’s work” and 
that the environment may not be accommodating.  
 
On the other hand, moving toward an all-volunteer force might not increase ethnic 
diversity in advanced welfare states such as Denmark. In countries where racial and 
ethnic status are tied to economic and social disadvantage, the opportunity to acquire 
useful skills, become socialized into the civic culture of the nation, and pass these traits 
on to children has proven to be a powerful inducement to join the armed forces – so 
much so that racial inequality in the American military has been overcome for both 
enlisted and officers.170 But in societies where such benefits are not coupled to public 
service, such as Denmark, these incentives will be less effective. Alternatively, motives 
such as inclusion, patriotism, and humanitarianism might be more powerful than in 
societies oriented toward individualism. Clearly, the motivation of persons to serve in 
the armed forces should be explored further. 
 
The respective experiences of the United States, United Kingdom, and Canada suggest 
that moving from conscription to an all-volunteer force, focused policies to develop, 
recruit, retain, and promote members of targeted groups, setting realistic goals, and 
monitoring, analyzing, and reporting personnel statistics on a regular basis are the most 
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effective policy steps that can be taken to adjust to the societal imperative of including 
all members of society in the armed services of the nation. 
 
To conclude, Demark has made some strides in pursuing the diversification of the 
personnel in its armed forces. It has utilized a policy of equal opportunity largely 
focused upon gender and implemented a succession of successful policies over the past 
50 years. Yet more could be done. The experiences of countries that have had more time 
to adapt to the functional and societal imperatives of the era, such as the United States, 
United Kingdom, and Canada, have much to offer – particularly as the armed forces of all 
three are more diverse than those of Denmark.  
 
 
 
